Interpretation and Social Explanation by Finlayson, Alan
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
It’s a pleasure to write a response to Keith Dowding’s new book. In 2004 I was part of a 
roundtable with him and others debating interpretive approaches to the study of politics 
(Finlayson, Bevir, Rhodes, Dowding & Hay, 2004). I was broadly in favour and Dowding 
was sceptical. Since then I have continued to find his work on methodology a provocation and 
a challenge in the best way possible; he is unusual in being at home talking knowledgably not 
only about the use of models in political science and statistical methods of analysis but also 
analytic political philosophy and philosophy of science. If only we were all so broad-minded. 
 
 
The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science is an impressive blend of political analysis 
with philosophy and theory. It develops and robustly defends an argument about the 
importance and value of prediction in political science and in so doing communicates a strong 
sense of its author. Reading it (what it says, does not say and the way it says it all) I was 
aware of being in the company of a distinct individual with distinct preoccupations, 
motivations and outlooks. Through that encounter I was able to reflect on my own 
preoccupations and motivations – those which are distinct from Dowding’s but also, 
importantly, those we have in common as people professionally and personally concerned 
with politics, with what we can and can’t usefully say about it and with how people might 
best intervene into their own political life. 
 
 
I mention this because it is true and because it illustrates a way of analysing something. The 
historian and philosopher R.G. Collingwood argued that the study of history is always the 
study of thought; people in the past thought about what they wanted to do and how to do it 
and in studying them we can ‘re-enact’ that thinking in our own mind. In so doing we gain 
knowledge of the past, of ourselves and of what it is to be a thinking thing. Dowding’s book  
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may not be from a distant past but it can be read in a Collingwood sort of a way: we can think 
along with him, seeing his purposes and motivations; we can follow his argument and also the 
reasons behind his wanting to make it in that way, right here and right now. 
 
 
Why would we want to do any of that? 
 
 
 
I can think of three main sorts of reason. Firstly (and in contrast to most forms of analytic 
philosophy) because we think that it is through such encounters with other people, and 
through reflection upon the experience, that we start to philosophise. From this point of view, 
trying to understand what others thought they were doing whenever they did it (and reflecting 
on the possibilities and impossibilities of such understanding) produces a distinct form of 
knowledge and is a contribution social science can make to philosophy and to human life in 
general. Secondly, because we might think of this as a valuable ethical activity: learning how 
to understand other people, seeing them as thinking beings, as ends in themselves and not 
only means to the end of generating research findings. From this perspective political science 
is part of a broader endeavour of the sort that Cicero would have put under the name of 
‘humanitas’ – the cultivation of personal and public virtue including an understanding of, and 
care for, that which makes us distinctly human. 
 
 
A third reason for this kind of analysis – and the one with which I am most concerned – is that 
in recreating in our own minds the thinking or the ‘logic’ of others we may develop our 
understanding not only of what they think and of how they think it but also of the context 
within which such things are thought (and, perhaps, have to be thought). From this point of 
view Dowding’s book is evidence not only of who he is and of what he is like but also of the 
‘lifeworld’ he (and we) inhabit - the complex of routine, ‘taken-for-granted’ meanings, ways 
of thinking and habitual practices which currently make up a particular kind of activity such 
  
 
 
 
as political science, academia or textbook writing and which are themselves parts of a 
particular society at a particular moment in time. An improved understanding of all that is a 
necessary prelude to intervening into it. 
 
 
Ideas in History 
 
 
 
With this in mind I want to take issue with Dowding’s discussion of the historian of political 
thought Quentin Skinner. In a section headed ‘Interpreting the Work of Dead People’ 
Dowding explains Skinner’s approach by reducing it to the identification of authorial 
intentions. This enables him to introduce a particular distinction and a concomitant division of 
intellectual labour - between the historian of ideas who ‘needs to understand what motivated 
the author’ (and so is interested in the political issues of that time) and the political 
philosopher for whom ‘what is more important is how these words speak to the issues of our 
day’ (2016: 220-221). In showing how our concepts are shaped by past interpretations and 
carry with them ‘normative baggage’, historians of ideas are an ancillary service for the 
proper philosophers: their ‘investigation into how terms change their meaning, carrying their 
moral connotations with them, enhances the weapons of the analytic philosopher’ (2016: 
221). 
 
 
I think that this underplays the extent and significance of what the historical study of political 
ideas and concepts reveals: that having a history is part of what a political idea is and that to 
have such an idea is also to be engaged with that history. As I have already indicated, 
interpretive approaches are concerned with ‘self-understanding’ of individuals and of the 
historical communities and cultures of which we are a part. Human beings are ‘thrown into’ a 
world of meanings, values, institutions and structures that simultaneously constrain and make 
possible their thinking and acting. A fundamental part of the ‘critical attitude’ we  associate 
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with Enlightenment is the struggle to become aware of the conditioning effects of such 
institutions and structures (a struggle made difficult by the fact that we must form that attitude 
from within them). The point of historical research is not simply to cleanse concepts of 
‘normative baggage’ but to understand the ways in which we are part of our own conceptual 
history and to identify the historical limits to our thinking which we might then seek to 
overcome (see Foucault, 1984). 
 
 
Within Political Studies this sort of approach has enabled the specification of a distinct object 
of study: a particular form or dimension of political activity, which Michael Freeden describes 
as ‘the political thinking actually taking place within political entities: the thinking produced 
by human beings in their political capacity as decision-makers, option-rankers, dissent and 
conflict regulators, support-mobilizers and vision creators; and the thinking consumed by 
them in that capacity’ (2005: 115). Such thinking and speaking – as Skinner’s research shows 
– takes place using the vocabulary, and within the genres of thought and communication, 
available to people who nevertheless make decisions about which words to use and in what 
order, how to arrange concepts, how to combine them or break them apart. Skinner’s work – 
as he has made very clear - is neither antiquarianism nor a way of sterilising concepts but an 
attempt to ‘illuminate the varying roles played by intellectual factors in political life…to 
begin to establish the connections between the world of ideology and the world of political 
action’ (1974: 280) and to investigate ‘the process of ideological formation and change’ 
(1974: 283). 
 
 
This – it seems to me – is also a theory of what political action is (or at least of a part of what it 
is). Political actors (often if not always) have to work out what to think and do and then explain 
it to others. They have to do so (often if not always) in ways that those others might accept as 
legitimate.  Skinner  has  particularly  focused  on  the use  and  dissemination by ‘innovating 
  
 
 
 
ideologists’ of ‘descriptive-evaluative’ terms which locate ideas and actions within a 
framework of moral approbation or disapprobation. Some of us take a broader view and look at 
more varied kinds of rhetorical political action – the ways in which political actors develop and 
deploy different kinds of argument or proof in constraining contexts, including the constraining 
logic of their own ideological and rhetorical positions (see, for example, Finlayson and Martin, 
2008; Finlayson, 2012). Skinner has himself become more explicit about his interest in rhetoric 
and political change (2002: Chapter 10). 
 
 
A politician’s speech, an academic article and a philosophical discussion are different kinds of 
thing but they all come from and feed back into the same historical ‘lifeworld’ and each may 
have important political effects. Concepts such as the ‘state of nature’ or the ‘original position’ 
were formed as parts of wider philosophical-political argument and they have contributed to 
our political history. To purify them of this history would not be to make them better concepts 
but to remove from them that which makes them important and interesting for political theory 
and political science. Furthermore, in examining how, why and with what effects such concepts 
are developed and disseminated we certainly should not confine ourselves to the canon of 
historical political theory. Other important cases might be concepts such as voter preference, 
veto-player and the spatial model. These are not only concepts of political science but also 
political concepts. They have become part of the vocabulary of some political actors and 
contribute to the ways in which they understand and shape their intentions, undertake their acts 
and reflect on them – affecting what Ian Hacking, calls ‘acting under a description’ (1995: 234- 
237). Sometimes the ideas and findings of political science are not causal explanations but (in 
shaping others’ self-understanding) actual causes. 
 
 
Governing Concepts 
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Given the potential for ideas and concepts to have such effects, the management or 
governance of their creation and dissemination is a fundamental matter of and for politics. It 
is always worth remembering that our tradition begins with Plato as an argument concerning 
how society must be if it is to enable the form of thought and speech which (he thinks) can 
establish what is just (and suppress the forms of poetry, music and rhetoric which might 
counter it); and with Aristotle’s claim that politics is ‘the most authoritative art’ because it 
‘ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens 
should learn and up to what point they should learn them’ (Ethics, 1, 1, 1094b). We might say 
that politics is all about who gets to say what to whom and how: differentiating and 
containing forms of knowledge production; establishing and maintaining procedures for 
judging the adequacy, accuracy and stylistic appropriateness of claims to knowledge; dealing 
with those who transgress the epistemological or ethical boundaries. 
 
 
Dowding’s book is concerned to do just this sort of thing (as a textbook should – this is not by 
itself a criticism). At the end he reflects on what it might be to conduct ourselves virtuously in 
our profession but before then he has pointed out various things which might be symptomatic 
of vice: lack of concern for truth, seeking a reputation by being dramatic, daring or rude 
(2016: 244-5); attachment to ‘isms’ and their use as labels which substitute for critique (2016: 
12); postmodernism (2016: 22-3); Foucault (2016: 222). What these have in common (on 
Dowding’s reckoning) is insufficient precision in their terminology and argumentation, which 
is in turn caused – he claims - by inability or refusal sufficiently to separate themselves from 
the world they want to talk about. For Dowding, political scientists should ‘step back’ (2016: 
247) from politics. In order to break from mere opinion (to develop nuanced beliefs based on 
assessments of probabilities backed by evidence) we must separate ourselves from activities 
such as political journalism, public policy and politics itself (2016: 243), overcome our desire 
to hang onto our opinions and let go of prejudices which might otherwise ‘infect’ our research 
  
 
 
 
(2016: 245). Thus the book is concerned with making and maintaining the distinctions and 
establishing the rules and conventions of thought and expression which can keep political 
science as free as possible from such infection. This involves, for example, separating the 
study of conventions, moral rules, institutions and languages from the taking of decisions 
about which of these might be changed and how. The first is a job for political science, the 
latter a task for political philosophy. Political science might study contestation over how to 
live but it cannot itself participate in it. 
 
 
As I’ve already said my own view is that political science is always a part of such contestation 
(although what kind of a part isn’t always clear). Because of this fact Dowding has to go to 
some effort to maintain the divisions of labour he proposes as well as specifying the nature, 
and restricting the applicability, of the concepts each field employs. While accepting that in 
political science there ‘really is no point in trying to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions to characterise entities for all times and places’ (2016: 190) he nevertheless, 
relying on the authority of Kripke, argues that we can designate the necessary meaning of 
some concepts such that their use is stable and agreed (at least for a given and specific 
purpose (2016: 191)). Such concepts must also conform to a number of rules. They should be 
as primitive as possible (i.e. basic and not dependent on other concepts), non-normative and 
simplified, ready for application to empirical cases (with a view to identifying the kinds of 
patterns which enable prediction). Meanwhile, in political philosophy – which has the job of 
establishing not ‘what people think but what they should think’ (2016: 224) - we should strive 
to ‘define our concepts in a manner that is as non-normative as possible’ so as to ‘enable 
greater commensurability in debate across moral theories’ (2016: 212, 227). Concepts should 
conform to everyday usage (2016: 225) and ‘in sharpening our vocabulary we should not 
change the moral force of terms’ (2016: 226) and draw on formal methods which have the 
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merit that ‘contradictions or incoherencies are less likely to be hidden than with the more 
literary and expansive styles’ (2016: 226-7). 
 
 
One can see how this approach to concepts is somewhat at variance with that which I 
presented in relation to historical studies of ideas and concepts. One might say that the 
variance is minimal or irrelevant in that Dowding is talking about how we form and use 
concepts in political science and not the concepts in use in political life. In that case all I am 
saying is that there is a need and a value for a historically (and rhetorically) informed 
ideational dimension to political science. But I think I am saying more than that. Dowding 
wants to develop concepts that are as normatively neutral as possible in order to use them to 
make predictive sense of politics. But political-science concepts come from and go back into 
the same ‘world’ as do the concepts which are part of politics – the world of our time, our 
place, our hierarchies of people, power and knowledge. What he proposes is not non- 
normative but a normative proposition about how to organise and govern these things. I am 
not opposed to such government but I do think there is a risk that without some hermeneutical 
self-criticism the concepts we invent in political science will be reflections of the world as it 
happens to be right now but appear objective precisely because they are homologous with the 
social world as it currently is. We will be governed without knowing it and reify present 
behaviours as necessary rather than show them as part of what a famous philosopher once 
called the ‘ensemble’ of current ‘social relations’ (Marx, 1938[1845]). 
 
 
The difference between us is that Dowding wants to take a ‘step back’ in order to be able to 
say what he (and we) hope will be true things about politics. This requires the introduction of 
rules or conventions to govern the claims made by scientists and philosophers, manage the 
borders between fields and claims of different sorts, and adjudicate the appropriateness of the 
styles in which such claims are expressed. For me such a project of refinement of the 
  
 
 
 
scientific instruments we will use to examine the world is – to steal a line from Hegel – like 
refusing to go into the water before one has learned to swim (1975: 14). We are already in the 
water and there is no dry land to swim to on which we might take a step back. The only 
choices are to swim deeper, faster and further trying to become more aware of the water 
around us and more conscious of the fact that we are swimming in it (aware that the truth of 
what we have to say about swimming is always a practical and historical as well as a 
theoretical problem). 
 
 
Political Science, one might say, needs to avoid all forms of hydrophobia. In a textbox - 
headed ‘interpreting in the sea of verbiage’ – Dowding takes time out for a sideswipe at 
Foucault. He mentions the philosopher’s ‘important contribution’ (2016: 223) but also says 
that Foucault wrote in an obscure way and did so deliberately (the former an aesthetic 
experience I’ve never had and the second a claim proven by reference to a well-worn 
anecdote simply accepted at face value). Clearly Dowding considers Foucault an exemplar of 
the virtue-free thinker - someone who wanted to be a ‘cult figure’ and whose style involves 
spattering ‘unintelligible garbage with some trivial truths’. He recommends to students that 
they ‘read Foucault quickly...life is too short to bother about trying to interpret impenetrable 
nonsense’ (2016: 222). This is a particularly explicit moment in which the book doesn’t take a 
step back and strive for non-normative thinking but engages in arbitrary intellectual policing. 
Foucault is declared out of bounds stylistically, ethically and epistemologically and someone 
from whom students must be protected.
1 
I think that’s a shame not least because Foucault is 
 
one of those who can help us to understand and act in relation to the politics of knowledge 
with which our field is so enmeshed. The enemy to good thinking isn’t Foucault – it’s the 
 
 
1 
Dowding ends the book by suggesting that citation rates ‘are as good a guide to what we think important interesting 
and true in political science as anything else’. A 2016 study of citations in (English language) social science found 
books by Foucault to be the 7th and 11th most cited in the field (Green, 2016). No other author has more than one entry 
in the top twenty-five. 
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kind of contemporary political opinion journalism and self-interested policy advocacy from 
which Dowding seeks to distance political science. The rise to dominance of these discourses 
and modes of communication (and the displacement of intellectual and scientific authorities) 
is a historic and social fact which we are all trying to explain and respond to. Rather than turn 
on each other we might gain a lot from, for example, Foucault’s studies of the history of 
forms of knowledge and of ‘governmentality’. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Politics of Politics 
 
 
 
Throughout the book Dowding is rather silent on the question of what in fact it is that we study. 
Most of the time the answer to the question of the object of our science is only implicit in 
references to things like voting, legislatures and so on. In the last chapter Dowding says of 
political science that he does not think ‘there is much worth in defining it at length. It depends 
on what you are interested in examining’. Politics, he says, can be understood narrowly or 
broadly ‘as concerned only with matters of the state or polity or as expressed in virtually any 
set of human interactions’. He even says that he has ‘no real concern if we want to go with a 
narrow definition concerning only political communities, leaving the rest to sociology or 
economics’ (2016: 243). 
 
 
I think we require more reflection than this. It makes a lot of difference (not only to theory 
and method but also to actual politics) if we confine our scope to the state or expand it to all 
human interactions. Here, I think, we might turn to ‘post-foundational’ political theories 
which make an important and valuable distinction between ‘politics’ and the ‘political’; 
between the ‘ontic’ aspects of politics – the specific ways in which people contest with each 
other – and the ‘ontology’ of that contest itself - the constitution of the field of battle (see 
Marchart, 2007). An analogy might be the difference between those who study football – the 
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different styles of play, the factors which suggest a team is more or less likely to win, the way 
changes to the rules have made or might make the game better or worse - and those who study 
what sport is and who want to know how it is that football came about, how it came to be a 
particularly dominant sport, how it relates to (and what are its effect upon) all the other kinds 
of sport (including those which we have not yet thought of). There certainly are all sorts of 
rules and practices within football which can be studied and understood in an objective way. 
But those rules and practices themselves have no objective foundation; they are the contingent 
outcome of ongoing historical activities (including the objective study of the rules). While we 
cannot think entirely apart from such a history we can cultivate awareness of its conditioning 
effects and so also a degree of self-awareness, as well as a capacity to take ethical and 
political responsibility for the relationship we have to the present of that history. It seems to 
me that Dowding is mostly concerned with politics (and we know from his work that he has 
interesting, important and useful things to say about it). But attention only to politics can 
falsely depoliticise the relationship of political science to the political dimensions of the 
lifeworld of which it is a part. That makes it harder for us to develop the kind of self- 
awareness needed if we are to assess how the claims we as political scientists make and put 
into practice authorise some forms of knowledge and disqualify others or – importantly – fail 
to authorise and disqualify. It also makes it harder to see the politics of our science and the 
ways in which we might take responsibility for them as scholars, teachers and citizens. 
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